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not actually work because discriminatory practices excluded him from employment, a result that the same courts have found to be inconsistent with the
Act. 47 The Fifth Circuit's expressed disdain for both fictional seniority and
reverse discrimination 48 will militate against a finding for the minority
plaintiffs that would reward fictional seniority. Such a result would be in
harmony with the Waters and Jersey Central opinions, wherein companywide
seniority systems that gave credit only for time actually worked were deemed
valid under the provisions of Title VII, and no action was taken that would
have abrogated the seniority rights of incumbent workers.
5
49
The instant court has skillfully merged the status quo and rightful place "
formulas by deciding that incumbent workers' positions in the employment
hierarchy shall not be terminated. Although the court seeks to guarantee
every minority worker full credit for all time actually worked, it will not
treat any worker preferentially because of his race. This result is fundamentally consistent with the goal of Title VII: equal employment opportunity
for all.
GREGORY P. BORGOGNONI

COMMERCIAL SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION CLARIFIED
Bigelow v. Virginia,421 U.S. 809 (1975)
Appellant, managing editor and responsible officer of a weekly newspaper, was convicted 1 of violating a Virginia statute that made it a mis47. See cases cited note 46 supra.
48. See Watkins v. United Steel Workers, Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1975);
Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 919 (1970).
49. See note 17 supra.
50. See note 20 supra.
1. Appellant was first tried and convicted in the County Court of Albemarle County.
On appeal to the Circuit Court for that county, the appellant waived his right to a jury
and received a trial de novo on stipulated facts. The court rejected appellant's claim that
the statute was unconstitutional under the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States. He was fined $500, $350 of which was suspended on the condition
of no further violations. The conviction was for publishing the following advertisement:
"UNWANTED PREGNANCY
LET US HELP YOU
Abortions are now legal in New York.
There are no residency requirements.
FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN ACCREDITED
HOSPITALS AND CLINICS AT LOW COST
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demeanor to encourage, by any means, the procuring of an abortion.2
Appellant had published an advertisement encouraging abortion procurement on behalf of a profit making abortion referral agency based in New
York where abortions had been legalized. The Virginia supreme court affirmed
the conviction,3 rejecting appellant's constitutional arguments on the grounds
that the advertisement was purely commercial and thus received no first
amendment protection, and held that statutory regulation was proper
in the medical-health field.4 The United States Supreme Court vacated and
remanded 5 for reconsideration in light of Roe v. Wadec and Doe v. Bolton7
which decisions legalized abortions performed prior to viability of the fetus.
Without hearing additional arguments from the parties, the Virginia supreme
court reaffirmed the conviction," holding that appellant's conviction was not
for performing an illegal abortion and that nothing in Roe or Doe mentioned
the subject of abortion advertisement. The United States Supreme Court
reversed and HELD, the statute, as applied, violated appellant's constitutional
rights in that speech is not. automatically stripped of first amendment protection because it has commercial aspects, particularly when the advertisement conveys information concerning a controversial issue of public interest o
The present case is the culmination of the Supreme Court's gradual efforts
Contact
WOMEN'S PAVILION
515 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

or call any time
(212) 371-6670 or (212) 371-6650
AVAILABLE 7 DAYS A WEEK
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. We will make all
arrangements for you and help you
with information and counseling."
2. VA. CODE ANN. §18.1-63 (1960) states: "If-any person, by publication, lecture, advertise-

ment, or by the sale or circulation of any, publication, or in any other manner, encourages
or prompts the procuring of abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
In the instant decision, the United States Supreme Court noted that at oral argument
the State said the statute dated back to 1878 and that appellant's prosecution was the
first under the statute "in modem times" and perhaps the only prosecution under it "at
any time." 421 U.S. 809, 813 n. 3 (1975).
1. Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972).
4. The court also considered the appellant's argument that the statute was overbroad.
This contention was rejected because appellant's activity was "purely commercial" and
lacked a legitimate f'fst amendment interest. The court concluded that petitioner did not
have standing to rely on the hypothetical rights of those in the noncommercial zone,
i.e., doctors, husbands, or lecturers. Id. at 198, 191 S.E.2d at 177-78.
5. Bigelow v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 909 (1973). -.
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973)..

7. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
8. Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 341, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1975).
9. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). In the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Blackmun, the Court
declined to rest- its decision, on'the potential overbreadth of the statute. The issue had
become moot for the future because the statute in question had effectively been repealed.
Id. at 817-18. See notes 2, 4 supra.
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to disengage itself from its ill considered' ° and over simplified" declarations
in Valentine v. Chrestensen.12 In that case the Court noted that while the
state "may not unduly ...proscribe" the exercise of freedom of speech, "[w]e
are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising."' 3 The Virginia supreme
5
court' 4 in the instant case and lower federal courts' have interpreted these

pronouncements broadly: whenever a communication has been classified as
purely commercial in nature, the communication has summarily been denied
first amendment protection..
This confusion that has existed in the area of first amendment protection
for commercial speech may be viewed as a reflection of the ambiguity that
has existed in interpretation of first amendment protection for noncommercial
speech. Until this century, the Court was not concerned with the "true
significance of the first amendment"'16 and at times has appeared to be slow
and halting in its search for unifying and guiding principles.17 Although
there are opposing theories as to the meaning and purpose of the first
18
the Court has repeatedly rejected 0 the "absolute view" that
amendment,
would apply literally the first amendment language that "Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." 20 Instead of a
literal construction, the Court has adopted the position that the manner of
expressing speech may be regulated and that the content of certain types of
speech may be controlled and suppressed.21 Speech not fully protected by the

10. Justice Douglas has characterized the Chrestensen opinion, in which he took part,
as "casual, almost offhand." 421 U.S. at 820 n.6, citing Cammarano v. United States, 358
U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
11. 421 U.S. at 820.
12. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
13. Id. at 54. The Court's statement in Chrestensen was in reference to use of the
streets as "proper places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and
disseminating opinion." Id. However, there was no explicit statement that its holding was
limited to the use of the streets, and dicta in later cases discussed the Chrestensen
decision in broad terms with ostensible approval. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). See discussion in text accompanying notes 48-51 infra.
14. Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. at 195, 191 S.E.2d at 175 (1972).
15. See, e.g., Howard v. State Dept. of Highways, 478 F.2d 581, 584 (10th Cir. 1973);
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir. 1971); George R. Whitten, Jr.,
Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 33 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850
(1970).
16. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1965).
17. Id.
18. Compare Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, in 1961 Sup. CT.
REv. 245 (P. Kurland ed. 1961) with Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
L.J. 877 (1963) and Black, The Bill of Rights and the Federal GovernAmendment, 72 YALLE
ment, in THE GREAT RIGiTs, 43 (E. Cahn ed. 1963).
19. E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
20. Id. at 514 (discussion of the "absolute view"). (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also
Black, supra note 18.
21. Brennan, supra note 16, at 4-5.
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first amendment includes fighting words, 22 obscenity, 23 libel, 24 and incitement,25 as well as commercial speech in some contexts. 26 The rationale for
allowing the regulation of certain types of speech has been that the words
were inherently offensive, or that they were without "redeeming social
value," 27 or that they created a "dear and present danger" of violent overthrow of the government. 28 Often the Court has embraced a balancing test
in those cases in which the regulation was "not intended directly to condemn
the content of speech but incidentally ... [to limit] its exercise. ' 29 This type
of test has required the Court to "balance the individual and social interest
in freedom of expression against the social interest sought by the regulation
which restricts expression."30
In sanctioning governmental regulation of some types of speech, the
Court until recently has never seemed to articulate clear guidelines defining the
type of speech that is protected or the reasons for its protection. Lack of
clarity created significant difficulties in anticipating the actions of the Court
because "none of these limitations has been given an across-the-board application."3' 1 Not until 1964 in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan3 2 did the Court
examine history "to discern [that] the central meaning of the first amendment
[is] 'that the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not
In the Sullivan decision, the Court
in the Government over the people.'
broadened overall first amendment protection and adopted a position that
information on issues important to the process of self-government by the
American electorate cannot be subject to governmental regulation. This view
has been expressed best by the statement that "[p]ublic discussions of public
issues, together with the spreading of information and opinion bearing on
those issues, must have a freedom unabridged by our agents." 34 Although the
Court has not always followed the view that freedom in issues of importance
to self-government must be absolute, this general approach apparently is
now central to the Supreme Court's view of the types of speech that are
afforded first amendment protection.
Against this backdrop, evolution of the judicial treatment afforded commercial speech can be brought into better focus. The leading commercial
"3

22. See, e.g., Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
23. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Roth V. United States, 453 U.S.
.476, 481-85 (1957).
24. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
25. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951).
26. See text accompanying notes 37-40 and 53-54 infra.
27. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
28. This test was first announced in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).

Subsequent decisions have modified the requirements for the test. Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
29. Brennan, supranote 16, at 11.
30. Emerson, supranote 18, at 912.
31. Brennan, supra note 16, at 11.
32. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
33. Brennan, supra note 16, at 15.
34. Meiklejohn, supranote 18, at 257,
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speech case of Valentine v. Chrestensen35 was decided two decades prior to
Sullivan and clearly reflected the early development of the Court's evolving
theory of the first amendment. In Chrestensen petitioner had been notified
by local authorities that street distribution of commercial handbills was
proscribed by ordinance but that the similar circulation of political material
was not. As a result, the petitioner printed a protest against certain city
actions on the reverse side of his advertisement and proceeded with the
distribution. On appeal, following petitioner's conviction under the ordinance,
the lower court reversed and expressed the view that weighing of the purpose
and intent of a handbill was too subjective a test for judicial application. 36
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that prohibition of the blatant attempt
to circumvent the ordinance could be constitutional. In its short opinion, the
Court dismissed commercial speech from the sphere of first amendment protection 37 and discerned the commercial nature of the advertisement by
analyzing its primary purpose.3 8
This primary purpose test again appeared in Breard v. Alexandria. 9 In
that case, a door to door solicitor of magazine subscriptions was convicted of
violating an ordinance that prohibited home canvassing. He appealed on the
grounds, inter alia, that the ordinance violated his first amendment freedom
of speech and press. Dismissing commercial matters from the sphere of first
amendment protection, the Court stated that the free speech defense would
not be open to "solicitors for gadgets and brushes." 40 As applied to magazine
solicitation, however, it was necessary to balance the competing interests of
freedom of the press and the householder's desire for privacy. In this context the privacy interest was favored. 41 Thus, commercial speech, as well as
"commercial features" of otherwise protected speech, 42 was again refused the
protection of the first amendment. Although the Breard balancing of interests
approach has been followed by a few courts43 and perhaps may be viewed
44
as a primitive precursor cf the approach adopted in the instant case, most
courts have continued to use the primary purpose test to classify a communica45
tion as commercial and consequently to deny it first amendment protection.
35. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
36. Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1941).
37. 316 U.S. at 54-55.
38. Id. Commentators have labeled this approach the "primary purpose test." See,
Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of
Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 429, 451 (1971); Resnick, Speech and Commercial
Solicitation, 30 CAL. L. REV. 655, 657 (1942); Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1028 (1967).
39. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
40. Id. at 641.
41. Id. at 644-45.
42. Id. at 642.
43. See, e.g., Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 300 F. Supp. 1036, 1039-40 (C.D.
Cal. 1969); In re Porterfield, 28 Cal.2d 91, 104-10, 168 P.2d 706, 715-18 (1946).
44. The Court in the instant case outlined the necessity for balancing the first amendment interests served against the competing governmental interests in regulation. The
primary distinction between Breard and the instant case is the method of gauging first
amendment interests. See notes 70-77 infra and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Howard v. State Dept. of Highways, 478 F.2d 581, 584 (10th Cir. 1973);
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Despite the language of Chrestensen and Breard, the Supreme Court has
recognized in several contexts that the primary purpose test is too simplistic
an approach. The profit motivation involved in book publishing,4 6 motion
picture production,47 and labor dispute picketing 8 has been held not to preclude first amendment protection. Irrespective of their motivation, these forms
of expression serve first amendment interests by informing the electorate of
matters of public interest. Similarly, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan49 the

Court recognized that although political advertisements are aimed at raising
funds and are accepted by the newspapers for commercial reasons, this does
not necessarily preclude first amendment protection. 50 Rather, the Court
viewed the advertisement in question as distinct from "'commercial' advertisement in the sense in which the word was used in Chrestensen" because no
commercial transaction was proposed. 51 The Sullivan advertisement "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested
claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose
existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern." 52 Thus, the Court adopted the view that discussion of matters essential
for self-governing receives the highest protection afforded by the first amendment.
Because the advertisement in Sullivan was explicitly distinguished from
a communication that merely proposed a commercial transaction, Sullivan
provided no real support for extending first amendment protection to commercial speech. Unless the product advertised was itself a traditionally protected vehicle, such as books, newspapers, magazines, and motion pictures, the sole
protection for purely commercial messages was the due process protection
afforded the property rights of the advertiser; moreover, these rights were
subject to regulation "whenever a state legislature decided that the public
interest so require[d]." 53
Commentators have been critical of the Court's stance vis-i-vis commercial
speech and have advocated first amendment protection for commercial speech54
for several reasons. First, unlike other types of speech subject to regulation,

SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir. 1971); George R. Whitten, Jr.,
Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 33 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850
(1970).
46. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966).
47. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952).
48. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103-05 (1940).

49. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
50. Respondent contended, inter alla, that an advertisement by a civil rights group
criticizing his official conduct was not protected by the first amendment because it was a
paid advertisement. He reasoned that the speech was therefore commercial and subject to
the rule in Chrestensen. Id. at 265-66. "That the Times was paid for publishing the
advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and books
are sold." Id. at 266.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.

53. Redish, supranote 38, at 430, 448-58.
54. See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra,
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commercial speech is not generally harmful per se.5 5 Second, although some
courts have recognized the need to examine commercial speech for possible
first amendment issues, most have ignored the potential problem of imposing
a regulation upon traditionally protected speech that may be included in an
otherwise commercial message. 56
A more basic criticism is directed by commentators at the view that
purely commercial speech- that which is devoid of information of "public
interest" as that term is defined by the Court- is properly outside the protection of the first amendment. The courts have generally followed the commercial speech doctrine without articulating its rationale, but one lower court
has suggested that protection of commercial speech is not appropriate because
product and service advertising does not affect the political process or contribute to the exchange of ideas and is generally not a form of individual
self-expression. 57 Critics of this rationale have argued that the advertising of
goods and services is informational and fundamental to social welfare. 58 The
educational function of such advertising contributes as much to the personal
self-realization essential to self-government as do the areas of traditionally
protected literary and artistic expression. 59 The possible ramifications of these
opposing positions were recognized by the Court in Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
60
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations.
In Pittsburgh Press the petitioner appealed an order requiring it to cease
publishing classified advertisements for employment using the designations
"male" and "female." This advertisement was held to be in violation of a
city ordinance prohibiting employers from making use of discriminatory employment advertising and forbidding any person from aiding in such act. 61 In
affirming the order, the Court retained the commercial speech distinction. The
Court viewed the want ad headings as merging with the advertisements themselves to form "an integrated commercial statement" 62 and emphasized that
this composite statement proposed illegal commercial activity.63 Distinguishing
Sullivan, the Court noted that the advertisement did not present editorial
opinion on either the merits of the ordinance itself or the method of enforcement. The petitioner argued forcefully that "the exchange of information is as
important in the commercial realm as in any other" and that the level of

55. Redish, supra note 38, at 431.
56. Id. See also DeVore & Nelson, Commercial Speech and Paid Access To the Press,
26 HASTINGS L.J. 745, 747-55 (1975); Goss, The First Amendment's Weakest Link: Government Regulation of Controversial Advertising, 20 N.Y.L.F. 617, 623-24 (1975); Note, Commercial Speech-An End In Sight To Chrestensen?, 23

DEPAUL

L. REv. 1258, 1268 (1974).

See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
57. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. National
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
58. See Goss, supra note 56, at 625-26; Redish, supra note 38, at 432-35.
59. Redish, supra note 38, at 443-48.
60. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
61. Id. at 378.
62. Id. at 388-89.
63. Id. at 388. The legal-illegal dichotomy is criticized in DeVore & Nelson, supra note
56, at 762-63.
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protection afforded commercial speech should therefore be reassessed.64
Because the Court found petitioner's argument inapplicable when the activity
in question was illegal discrimination, it left to future cases any test of the
merits of petitioner's argument in other factual situations.6 Notably, the
Court did not specifically hold that all "classic examples of commercial speech"
are unprotected. 66 Instead, the Court implied in dictum that a balancing
approach might be used to weigh "[a]ny First Amendment interest which
might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal... [against]
67
the governmental interest supporting the regulation ....
Elaborately explaining the status of commercial speech, the instant case
clarifies and applies the balancing test suggested in the dictum of Pittsburgh
65
Press.
The Court stopped short of overruling Chrestensen,69 but sharply
narrowed that decision to its own factual situation.7o The instant opinion
announced that, despite commercial content or purpose, a communication may
still be properly afforded some measure of first amendment protection. The
degree of protection, however, depends on the extent to which first amendment interests are served.71 In the instant case, the factors leading to protection were overwhelming. The advertisement provided information important to those possibly in need of the abortion service, to those with
interest in the laws of another state, and to those seeking reform of current
Virginia statutes.7 2 Moreover, the matter "actively advertised pertained to
64. 413 U.S. at 385-89.
65. Id. at 388-89.
66.

Id. at 385.

67. Id. at 389. The term "balancing test" was not expressly used. The complete text
of the relevant portion of the Court's opinion is as follows: "Any First Amendment interest
which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might
arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent
when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental
to a valid limitation on economic activity." Id. at 389. Despite this ostensible concession to
the argument that commercial speech may be deserving of first amendment protection in
some contexts, the issue remained far from being conclusively resolved.
68. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The Court did employ a balancing test to afford first amend-

ment protection to the abortion referral service advertisement, but the protection was
afforded primarily on the basis of the noncommercial aspects of public interest that the
Court identified in the advertisement. Apparently, consumer education information as to
price, quality, availability, etc. is still generally not included within the Court's notion
of first amendment interests. For further explanation see text accompanying notes 71-78
infra.
69. See text accompanying notes 12-13 and 35-36 supra.
70. The Chrestensen holding was explained as a distinctly limited one, upholding the
ordinance "as a reasonable regulation of the manner in which commercial advertising could
be distributed. . . . The case obviously does not support any sweeping proposition that
advertising is unprotected per se." 420 U.S. at 819-20. In a footnote the Court acknowledged
a stream of criticism of Chrestensen including that of Mr. Justice Douglas, who had joined
in that opinion, that "[t]he ruling was casual, almost offhand. And it has not survived
reflection." 421 U.S. at 820 n.6.
71. Id. at 826.
72. The Court focused on the existence of the abortion referral agency itself and
two lines in the advertisement in particular: "Abortions are now legal in New York. There
are no residency requirements." Id. at 822.
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. . .

of the general public, ' 3 and the appellant was a

newspaper editor rather than an advertiser, which gave "more serious
First Amendment overtones" to the case.74 Unlike the discriminatory activity
in PittsburghPress, the advertised abortion service was legal in the state where
the abortions would be performed. 75 Also, the advertised abortions were to
occur in another state and, as such, were beyond regulation by the Virginia
legislature. The Court was apprehensive that through a statute similar to
the one in the instant case a state could exert power over interstate media
and "impair . .. their proper functioning." 76 In view of these extensive first
amendment interests, the statute was viewed as an attempt by Virginia ' to
7
prevent its citizens from "hearing or reading about the New York services." 7
The court concluded that this encroachment on the first amendment rights of
its citizens far outweighed Virginia's alleged interest in preventing commercial exploitation of the health needs of its citizens.
Arguing that the commercial speech doctrine and the primary purpose
test of Chrestensen should be upheld, the dissent reasoned that the conviction
in the instant case should be affirmed. The dissent viewed the Court's decision
as an attempt to fashion a doctrine to afford first amendment protection to
a specific specimen of commercial speech without overruling its previous
78
inconsistent decisions.
The Court did explicitly limit its holding and left to future cases "the
precise extent to which the First Amendment permits regulation of advertising
related to activities the State may legitimately regulate or even prohibit."' 9
The Court also indicated that the results of past decisions in lower courts
"were not inconsistent" with the holding in the principal case;80 however, it
is unlikely the case is the aberration the dissent suggests it is. Viewed in the
context of past cases, the instant case is a logical step in the evolution of the
Court's first amendment theory. Faced with the proper case the Court
will likely extend its holding to other types of commercial advertisements.81
Nevertheless, the view of the dissent may well be a caveat for the future since
the balancing test remains an ad hoc solution. The instant opinion contains
73.

Id. The Court cited Roe and Doe in this connection. See text accompanying notes

5-9 supra.
74. Id. at 828.
75. New York subsequently barred operations by abortion referral agencies as in
violation of the public interest in the ethical and professional conduct of medicine. Id. at 82223 n.8.
76. Id. at 829.
77. Id. at 827. It is unclear if the Court was defining the motivation, the intent, or
the effect of the statute. In this context it must be kept in mind that appellant's conviction
was probably the only one in the 93-year history of the statute. See note 2 supra. In footnotes the Court mentioned that appellant's brief described the publication as an "underground newspaper," 421 U.S. at 811 n.1, and that appellant contended "that under the
circumstances [publishing] . . - the advertisement was . . . 'an implicit editorial endorsement' of its message." Id. at 822 n.7.
78. Id. at 830 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 825.
80. Id. at 825 n.10.
81. For application of the holding of Bigelow to contraceptive advertising, see Population
Serv. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp 321, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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such a multiplicity of factors termed relevant by the Court that the commercial
speech doctrine may still be able to serve whatever interests the Court feels
are socially desirable. There is also the hazard that lower courts may view8 2the
instant case as a decision compelled by a peculiar set of circumstances. If
so, the guidelines of the instant decision will have more impact on the
language of lower court decisions than on their actual outcome.
Despite these shortcomings, the principal case must be viewed as a major
step in recognizing that first amendment interests may accompany commercial speech. As the dissent noted, there is a major distinction between
editorial advertisements such as that in Sullivan, and the advertisement in
the instant case,13 which, to paraphrase the Court in Pittsburgh Press,
expressed no views as to the propriety of the Virginia abortion laws or the
law under which appellant was convicted. 4 In fact, the importance of the
instant case lies with this distinction: it is the first case in which the Court
has found first amendment interests in an advertisement that proposes only
a commercial transaction. As was observed in the Chrestensen opinion, the
dissent argued that the effect of this holding would be to enable evasion of
otherwise proper regulation by appending "a civic appeal, or a moral platitude" to a purely commercial message. 5 Although the potential for abuse may
be real, such a result is unlikely. Under the balancing approach, the courts
will retain considerable discretion. Although all first amendment interests
accompanying commercial speech must be taken into consideration, they will
not be examined in a vacuum; instead, they are to be weighed against the
competing governmental interest in regulation. This decision does not limit
courts to an analysis of the message itself. The Court explicitly recognized
that "diverse motives, means, and messages of advertising may make speech
'commercial' in widely varying degrees" and that first amendment protection
may vary according to the interests involved. 6 In addition, the Supreme Court
has noted that "all public expression," noncommercial as well as commercial,
"may be subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public
interest." 7
82. That this hazard is real is evidenced by the language of the district court in

Population Services Int'l suggesting that in light of Bigelow "it is still the law that purely
commercial speech--whatever may be the scope of that term -does not enjoy constitutional
protection. Therefore, as to advertisemerits and displays which are purely commercial, this
Court concludes that these may validly be regulated by the State. We do not accept the
position ... that any advertisement of contraceptive products is so linked to the exercise
of a protected privacy right that it is protected by the Constitution." Id. at 837.
In a footnote, the district court pointed out that it was aware of the language in
Bigelow noting that the activity in question, legal abortions, "'pertained to constitutional
interests.' ... However, this was one of many factors mentioned by the Supreme Court in
reaching its conclusion that the advertisement in question was protected by the First Amendment. We do not read Bigelow, or any other decision of which we are aware, as standing
for the absolute prohibition urged upon us by the plaintiffs." Id. at 87 n.24.
83. 421 US. at 882. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
84.
85.
86.
87.

418 U.S. at 884-85.
421 U.S. at 832.
Id. at.826.
Id.
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